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13 OCT 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Signature on Letter for Secretary Shultz

1. Action Requested: Your signature on the attached letter to Secretary Shultz recommending he look at a draft Intelligence Assessment on the Arab-Israeli conflict prior to his departure for the Middle East. 25X1

2. Background: As the attached letter indicates, a draft unclassified version of the NESA Special Project "Arab-Israeli Conflict: In Search of a Settlement" has been favorably reviewed by Dr. Henry Kissinger and other former senior US Government officials. We believe the Secretary will find the paper of interest, given his upcoming trip to the Middle East to discuss the peace process. The Secretary's itinerary is not yet firm, but he tentatively plans to go to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia before his visit to Moscow. We expect the Secretary will depart Washington on about 15 October. The author of the special project is [redacted] 25X1 25X1

[redacted]
Richard J. Kerr

Attachment:
As stated

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I believe the enclosed draft on the Arab-Israeli conflict, prepared in our Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, will be of interest to you as you prepare for talks in the Middle East. The project attempts to take a comprehensive look at the basic components of the conflict, paying particular attention to the major impediments to peace, internal differences and minimum objectives of the various parties, areas of potential compromise as well as deadlock, and the viability of various negotiating formulas. The draft is still undergoing review and revision, but I am sending it along now so you will have a chance to see it before your trip.

An earlier unclassified draft was discussed with several former US policymakers with extensive experience in Arab-Israeli issues, including Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sol Linowitz, Joe Sisco, Hermann Eilts, and Sam Lewis. The reactions to the draft were very favorable; Kissinger called it "a damn good paper." The current draft incorporates many of their suggestions. The consultants differed among themselves on many points, however.

Some differences of view are spelled out in the text. Several of our own Middle East experts also doubt whether the type of hypothetical settlement outlined in the paper could be achieved in the foreseeable future.

We plan to discuss the draft before publication with Mission officers in the region. We are sending a copy to your NEA shop.

If we can be of any further assistance on this subject, please do not hesitate to call us.

Sincerely yours,

25X1

William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

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SUBJECT: Signature on Letter for Secretary Shultz

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OCA 87-5509
28 October 1987

NOTE FOR: The Director

FROM: Dave Gries STAT

SUBJECT: Cohen Bill Picks Up Endorsements

Senator Boren, together with Senators Inouye, Rudman and Mitchell, have gone on record in support of the Cohen bill. These endorsements from the Chairmen of the Intelligence and Iran/Contra Committees make the Cohen bill the likely vehicle for post-Iran/Contra efforts to tighten oversight.

As you know, National Security Decision Directive 286 and the Cohen bill are similar in many respects. Although we would prefer not to have legislation, we can live with these portions. Other parts of the bill break new ground in requiring prior notification of collection operations. We would want to fight that concept as vigorously as possible. Fortunately, Senator Boren is not expected to give much support to that part of the bill.

We have a draft views letter on the Cohen bill and will soon be sending it to you for review. We are also drafting language that would strip or weaken the most objectionable portions of the bill.

As I noted on Tuesday at staff meeting, the Spector bill is much less of a threat, particularly now that Senator Boren has signed on to the Cohen bill. There is little support in the Intelligence Committee for the more onerous features of the Spector Bil.

Attachment

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vs Bulletin THE WASHINGTON POST
PAGE : 4
28 OCT. 1987
ITEM NO. 1

Specter Urges Splitting Top CIA Post, Tougher Penalty for Lying

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, yesterday introduced legislative reforms for the Central Intelligence Agency stemming from the Iran-contra scandal, including a proposal calling for mandatory prison terms for government officials convicted of lying to Congress.

He also joined other Senate and House members who have proposed that President Reagan and his successors be required by law to inform Congress within one or two days after approval of any covert intelligence operations.

Specter also proposed splitting the director of central intelligence job into two posts: a director of national intelligence to be the president's primary adviser on foreign intelligence, supervise all U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies, and serve as a member of the National Security Council, and a director of the Central Intelligence Agency to manage the agency and carry out covert action.

Currently, the CIA director is charged with providing the president and his advisers objective intelligence relating to policy and at the same time carrying out covert operations to support that policy.

Specter said that splitting the job would end what he called problems of "objectivity and reliability" created by a "foreign policy activist" such as the late William J. Casey. Referring to differences that developed between CIA Director Casey and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Specter said, "We cannot afford to have two secretaries of state, two foreign policy-makers who may be attempting to move the country in different directions, one overtly and the other covertly."

Casey, Specter said, was not the first director "who desired to be involved to some degree in the formulation or implementation of foreign policy, nor is he likely to be the last."

Specter called for a presidentially appointed, independent inspector general for the CIA. The CIA is one of the few government agencies whose director still appoints his own inspector general, which Specter said "is not conducive to objectivity."

He pointed out that the CIA of-

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ficial with operational responsibility for the controversial 1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors was later named inspector general.

Other sources pointed out yesterday that the current inspector general's investigation of CIA activities on behalf of the Nicaraguan contra rebels during the time it was prohibited by law had to be redone when it became apparent that agency personnel were giving him false stories.

Specter's proposal for congressional notification of all covert actions within 24 hours after presidential approval appears to have the best chance for passage because versions of it have already been introduced by top members of the House and Senate intelligence panels.

Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine), vice chairman of the Senate committee, introduced legislation requiring notice within 48 hours. Cohen is expected to announce today that his measure is supported by intelligence committee Chairman Sen. David L. Boren (D-Okla.) and three key members of the Iran-contra investigating panel: Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), the chairman; Sen. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.), the vice chairman, and Sen. George J. Mitchell (D-Maine).

Under law, the president is required to consult with Congress in advance on covert operations, but the chief executive is allowed, in special circumstances, to give only "timely notice" after an operation has begun.

Reagan used that loophole to delay telling Congress about the Iran arms sales until after they were exposed in the press 10 months later.

The White House has traditionally opposed a time limit on such notification, and in a letter to Boren and Cohen after the Iran-contra hearings ended, Reagan indicated he still would demand the right to delay notification in special circumstances.

In demanding jail sentences for officials found deliberately misleading committees, Specter argued that congressional oversight cannot be accomplished if Congress is given false or misleading testimony. Specter said the situation is "especially problemsome where witnesses appear before the intelligence committees in a secret session .... Under those circumstances, the committees realistically have little or no opportunity to determine the truth."

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